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In Italy, following WWII, speci￿c hiring procedures were developed that pre-
vented ￿rms from screening workers. More in particular, these institutions char-
acterized the Italian labor market with respect to the US labor market, and were
gradually removed during the 1990s. A simple matching model in which the
usual Nash bargaining criterion is replaced by a game of incomplete informa-
tion, shows that such hiring procedures endogenously generate wage compression
within groups of observationally equivalent workers, as well as higher unemploy-
ment rates. Both the estimated behavior of within-group wage inequality in Italy,
computed from the micro-data of the SHIW panel of the Bank of Italy, and the
behavior of the unemployment rate in the late 1990s, are consistent with the pre-
dictions of the model.
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To explain the di⁄erent performance of OECD countries in terms of unemployment
and wage inequality, the theoretical and empirical literature has investigated the role
of di⁄erent institutions such as minimum wages, unemployment bene￿ts, employment
protection and centralization in wage bargaining. Many of these studies have docu-
mented the existence of a trade-o⁄between unemployment and wage inequality, and for
the most part they have focused on total inequality in the aggregate wage distribution.1
Little research instead has investigated the sources of within group wage inequality,
i.e., wage dispersion within groups of observationally equivalent workers. As Acemoglu
(2002, p.14) points out ￿we know relatively little about the determinants of residual
inequality,...[or] about cross-country di⁄erences in the behavior of wage inequality...
[and] much more research in this topic is needed￿ .
This paper contributes to ￿ll the gap on the theoretical side by presenting a novel
determinant of unemployment and within-group wage inequality which implies a trade-
o⁄ between the two. The focus is on the broad set of institutions which prevent ￿rms
from screening workers. Lazear (1995) shows that ￿rms can extract information about
the non-observable determinants of workers￿productivity through the use of screening
tests. I argue that the amount of information that can be extracted is a⁄ected by
labor market institutions. I thus de￿ne institutions preventing screening (hereafter
IPS) as all the rules and regulations that may, directly or indirectly, prevent ￿rms
from obtaining information which is useful to predict workers￿productivity.
As it is carefully documented in the next section, IPS had a fundamental impor-
tance in the functioning of the Italian labor market. Following WWII, the cornerstone
of the Italian labor market regulation, Act 264 of 1949, prevented ￿rms from choosing
directly the workers they wanted to hire. Instead, workers could be hired only through
public placement agencies. In the case of manual workers, ￿rms could only make a nu-
merical request to these agencies, specifying the number of workers they needed. The
public agencies would have then selected the workers to be hired, on the basis of their
economic need to ￿nd a job. Besides hindering screening procedures prior to forming a
match, the Italian legislator, following post-war European standards, restricted access
to temporary contracts and limited the duration of probationary periods. As a conse-
quence, ￿rms in the Italian labor market were also hindered in screening workers on
the job. Brie￿ y, ￿rms could only draw up permanent contracts, having little informa-
tion on the characteristics of the workers. IPS can be thus considered as a distinctive
feature of the Italian labor market, and to some extent of the European labor market,
as opposed to the US labor market. Nevertheless, as documented in the next section,
the evolution of the Italian juridical system suggests that the in￿ uence of IPS has been
strongly declining since the beginning of the 1990s.
In order to assess the e⁄ects of IPS, the standard matching model presented by
Pissarides (2000) is extended in the following directions. First, workers are no longer
identical: heterogeneity across workers re￿ ects permanent di⁄erences in individual
productivity. Second, as is common in adverse selection models of the labor market,
individual productivity is known to the worker but not to the ￿rm at the time the
worker is hired. Third, contracts are bargained once and for all, and they cannot be
1See Blau and Kahn (1999) for a review and Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001).
1conditional on future performance. Finally, it is assumed that a worker must take a
screening test upon matching. The outcome of the screening test is for the ￿rm a
noisy signal over the productivity type. Labor market institutions a⁄ecting the infor-
mation content of the screening procedures are modeled as a parameter de￿ned over
a continuous support which represents the precision of this signal. IPS are associated
with a relatively low degree of precision. Changes in the parameter representing labor
market institutions will allow all intermediate scenarios of incomplete information to
be represented, ranging from the case in which the signal is completely uninformative
to the case in which the signal reveals the worker￿ s type perfectly.
The model requires solving a bargaining game of incomplete information. This is
necessary since the commonly used Nash bargaining criterion is no longer applicable
with one-sided imperfect information on the payo⁄s. The standard way for modeling
bargaining in this case is to assume that either the worker or the ￿rm makes a take-it or
leave-it o⁄er with given probabilities. This approach has been exploited in the context
of macroeconomic models of the labor market also by Kennan (2006) and Tawara
(2005), but for the opposite case in which the ￿rm has private information over the
productivity of the worker. In the modeling of this bargaining procedure, I add on
their work by considering signal extraction. One feature of this game which makes it
particularly attractive is that under perfect information the solution is the commonly
used Nash bargaining criterion (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004).
The model builds on the literature of asymmetric information in matching models
with heterogeneous agents. Three papers that are worth mentioning in this ￿eld of
study are Strand (2000), Montgomery (1999) and Pries and Rogerson (2005). Strand
(2000) shows that a lack of information on workers￿characteristics may lead ￿rms
to employ too few workers. His work is based on the assumption that in a market
with no frictions ￿rms can reward workers for their productivity after having paid a
￿xed screening cost. This paper departs from his study in two directions: frictions are
introduced to analyze the behavior of unemployment at equilibrium, and imperfect
screening to study the e⁄ects of IPS.
Montgomery (1999) builds a dynamic matching model with heterogeneous agents
and adverse selection. While he assumes an exogenous wage rate, wage compression
arises endogenously in this framework and reacts both to the composition of the un-
employment pool and to the nature of labor market institutions.
Pries and Rogerson (2005) build a model to account for the fact that worker
turnover in Europe is much less than in the US. While they assume workers to be
homogeneous before matching, and information about match-speci￿c productivity to
be unobservable upon bargaining both for the worker and for the ￿rm, in this pa-
per workers are allowed to be ex-ante heterogeneous and to have private information
about their type. Although Pries and Rogerson (2005) recognize the importance that
screening procedures might have on the aggregate labor market equilibrium, they only
investigate the role of standard labor market institutions, and do not analyze how the
equilibrium changes with the precision of the screening procedures. This is the task I
take up in this paper.
This work identi￿es two sources of within-group wage inequality. The ￿rst is ran-
dom bargaining power and stems from the assumptions about the bargaining game:
workers with the same observable and non-observable characteristics might be paid
2di⁄erently as they could have di⁄erent bargaining powers upon matching. The second
source is the precision of the signal, which measures how labor market institutions
a⁄ect the information content of the screening procedures. It is shown that the bar-
gaining game yields two di⁄erent equilibria depending on this. The main result is that
when institutions prevent ￿rms from screening so that the precision of the signal is low,
within-group wage dispersion is low, the average wage is high and the unemployment
rate is high. On the contrary, when the precision of the signal is accurate, within-group
wage dispersion is high, the average wage is low, and the unemployment rate is low.
The model also gives the following predictions. Increasing the information content
of the screening procedures from the lowerbound to the upperbound of the support
of admissible values, shows a jump in within-group wage inequality, but not in the
unemployment rate. This jump is the result of a shift in the equilibrium strategies of
the game. Further increases to the right of the threshold that triggers the shift strictly
decrease the unemployment rate.
In order to test the predictions of the model, using micro-data from the Historical
Archive of the Bank of Italy￿ s Survey of Household Income and Wealth, I compute
the behavior of the residual wage inequality four years before and after the removal
of the system of numeric placement lists, in 1991, for the workers passing through the
lists. The pattern of wage inequality shows a jump of about 30% following the reforms
of the placement agencies. Within this framework, the jump can be interpreted as
the outcome of di⁄erent equilibrium strategies in the bargaining game, produced by
di⁄erent labor market institutions a⁄ecting the information content of the screening
procedures.
The results of the paper have also two other important implications. Concerning
cross-country di⁄erences in residual wage inequality, the model can o⁄er an alternative
explanation for the ￿ndings of Flinn (2002), who shows that residual wage inequality
in 1989 was considerably lower in Italy than in the US. Concerning the behavior of
the unemployment rate in Italy, the model can contribute to explain the drop in the
unemployment rate that followed the reforms of 1997 and 2003, which enhanced access
to temporary contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents IPS in Italy. The model is
presented in Section 3 and it is solved numerically in Section 4. Section 5 presents the
empirical evidence, and Section 6 concludes.
2 An interesting example of IPS: the case of Italy
Following WWII, in Italy, the economic inequalities brought about by the war and the
spread of the communist ideology sharply oriented the legislator towards the target of
social justice. These historical and political considerations, together with the desire to
prevent labor exploitation and fraud, explain the creation of Act 264 of 1949, which
was, until recent years, the cornerstone of the Italian labor market regulation.2 In
principle, Act 264 of 1949 prevented employers from hiring directly, or through private
placement agencies, the workers they needed. Following international labor standards
2See ￿Temporary Work and Labour Law of the European Community and Member States￿ , 1993,
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, The Netherlands.
3of the time, any private intermediation activity between labor supply and demand
was penally forbidden. Firms were therefore obliged to resort to public placement
agencies. In the case of manual workers, ￿rms could only make a numerical request to
these agencies, specifying the number of workers they needed, while the selection of the
workers to be hired was up to the agencies. Job-seekers were sorted into di⁄erent lists
according to their professional category, the so-called liste di collocamento, and within
each classi￿cation they were graded according to their economic need to ￿nd a job. This
grading had to take into consideration ranking criteria such as the number of children
and the family income of the job-seeker. Among two equally graded job-seekers, the
one that enrolled ￿rst prevailed. If a ￿rm hired workers outside the numerical lists,
it would incur in penal and administrative sanctions. Moreover, a labor contract
signed between the parties in violation of Act 264 of 1949 was null and void if the
local organisms of the Ministry of Labor reported it within a year from the signature.
Since 1949, the scope of the act has been partially reduced by a number of additional
acts (Act 300 of 1970, Act 79 of 1983, Act 863 of 1984 and Art.17 of Act 56 of
1987) implementing derogations to this rigid system and allowing in some cases for
individuals to be speci￿cally requested, rather then derived from the numerical lists.
The system of numerical requests was ￿nally abrogated by Act 223 of 1991. It is clear
that as long as the ￿rms could not hire workers on the grounds of their ability, they
were de jure prevented from screening.
The Italian legislator went even further in preventing ￿rms from screening, by
limiting both the duration of probation periods and access to temporary contracts.
According to the indicators reported by the OECD (1999), by the end of the 1990s the
Italian legislation provided for the lowest probation period among all OECD countries.
It is very likely that such a short time span hampered the ability of employers to collect
relevant information on the productivity of the workers.3
As an alternative to hiring on probation for a permanent position, ￿xed-term con-
tracts can be used by ￿rms to test the ability or the motivation of a worker. In this
sense temporary contracts have been considered, in a series of recent papers, as screen-
ing devices that are similar to probation. In particular, Varejao and Portugal (2003),
in a study on the Portuguese labor market, ￿nd that screening workers for permanent
positions is the single most important reason why ￿rms use these types of contracts. In
general, this view has been supported by strong empirical evidence.4 The importance
of ￿xed-term contracts as a screening device has been discovered only recently, and its
implications at the macro level are not yet clear. However, the new body of empirical
evidence looks like a challenge for the standard macroeconomic perspective that has
always considered temporary work mainly as an instrument capable of guaranteeing
separation at low or zero ￿ring costs.5 Unlike other countries in Europe, Italy had no
speci￿c regulation for temporary work and private placement agencies until the Treu
3Ichino and Muelheusser (2004) show that if the length of the probation period is too short, shirkers
have an incentive to mimic the behavior of high type workers in order to pass the hiring test. In this
case the test is uninformative on workers￿characteristics and worthless as a screening device.
4See, among many others, Autor (2001), Autor and Houseman (2005), Boockman and Hagen (2005),
Houseman (2001), Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2004), and Storrie (2002).
5Cahuc and Postel Vinay (2002) p.64, write: "It is generally concluded that the introduction of ￿xed
duration contracts is equivalent to the reduction of ￿ring costs and that its impact on unemployment
is therefore ambiguous".
4law was approved, in 1997.6 As a result, this reform had an enormous impact on the
Italian labor institutions. More recently, with the Act 30 of 14 February 2003, better
known as Legge Biagi, the regulation of temporary contracts introduced in 1997 was
extended to further enhance labor market ￿ exibility.
Given that the institutions above have played a key role in shaping the functioning
of the Italian labor market, it is possible to consider them as marking a major institu-
tional di⁄erence with respect to US-style labor markets. In the next section a model




The economy is characterized by a continuum of identical ￿rms and heterogenous
workers, both risk neutral and in￿nitely lived. The set of workers I has unit measure.
Each worker i 2 I can be either employed or unemployed and has private information
over her type pro￿le, ￿i 2 ￿, where ￿ = fl;hg is the space of type pro￿les, and l
and h denote low and high type workers, respectively. A fraction x of workers are
low types, and a fraction 1 ￿ x are high types. High and low types di⁄er in their
productivity, which is denoted by y￿; and in the opportunity cost of employment,
denoted by z￿, for ￿ = l;h. It is assumed that yl < yh and zl ￿ zh. It is possible to
think about the productivity of high and low types as parameters capturing individual
heterogeneity within groups of observationally equivalent workers, i.e., workers with
the same profession, education, age, and gender. Both types search in the same labor
market.
The labor market is frictional, and ￿rms which want to ￿ll a job post a vacancy.
It is assumed that each ￿rm can post one vacancy at most. Labor is the only factor of
production, and all agents discount future income at the exogenous rate r. Employment
relationships end exogenously at rate q leaving the worker unemployed and the ￿rm
with a vacant position.
The matching technology:
The matching process is described by the function M (v;u); which represents the
aggregate ￿ ow of hires in a unit period. v denotes the measure of vacancies, and u
denotes aggregate unemployment, which is the sum of high and low type unemployed
workers, denoted, respectively, by uh and ul. Time is assumed to be discrete, but since
I am only interested in characterizing the behavior of the economy at the stationary
equilibrium, I omit the time subscript. The function M (v;u) is assumed to be strictly
increasing with respect to each of its arguments and such that M (v;0) = M (0;u) = 0:
Lastly, it is assumed that the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale. The













6Act 196 of 24 june 1997, "Norme in materia di promozione dell￿ occupazione.", Gazzetta U¢ ciale
n. 154, July 4, 1997 - Supplemento No. 136.
5where ￿ represents the "tightness" of the labor market. The probability that a worker









and it is assumed to be equal for high and low type workers.
3.2 Workers and Firms
E￿i (!i) denotes the discounted expected income of the worker i 2 I of type ￿i 2 ￿
employed at wage !i, and U￿i the expected discounted income of the same worker when
unemployed. In each period, the employed worker i 2 I loses the job with exogenous
probability q. At the stationary equilibrium, the ￿ ow value of employment for a type
￿ worker satis￿es the following condition, where the subscript i is omitted hereafter
for notational clarity:
rE￿ (!) = ! + q [U￿ ￿ E￿ (!)]; ￿ = l;h: (1)
Let us denote by ￿w
￿ and ￿f the payo⁄ expected upon contact by a worker of type ￿
and by a ￿rm, respectively. Both of these values will be de￿ned later as the equilibrium
outcomes of the bargaining game. The ￿ ow value of unemployment for a worker of
type ￿ satis￿es:
rU￿ = z￿ + ￿m(￿)(￿w
￿ ￿ U￿); ￿ = l;h: (2)
c denotes the cost of holding an open vacancy and looking for an employee per unit
of time, and V the value of having a vacancy opened. The ￿ ow value of a vacancy
satis￿es the following Bellman equation:
rV = ￿c + m(￿)￿f:
Using the free entry condition, V = 0, the expression above can be rewritten as follows:
c = m(￿)￿f; (3)
which implies that the expected pro￿ts of an entrant ￿rm must equal the expected
costs of keeping a vacancy open.
The ￿ ow value for the ￿rm of having a worker of type ￿ employed at wage ! is
denoted by J￿ (!), and satis￿es the following equation:
rJ￿ (!) = y￿ ￿ ! ￿ qJ￿ (!): (4)
3.3 Wage bargaining
It is assumed that wage bargaining is decentralized, and that workers and ￿rms are
too small to in￿ uence the market wage rate. Wages are set once and for all, and they
cannot be conditional on future performance. It is also assumed that ￿rms do not
directly observe the productivity of the workers upon matching, but that they know
the composition of the unemployment pool and can observe the realization of a signal
￿ 2 ￿, where ￿ = f0;1g is the set of signals. It is possible to interpret the signal
as the outcome of a screening test which workers must take upon contact. We can
6think about job interviews, probation periods or temporary contracts as examples of
screening tests. When ￿ = 1; the worker passes the test, while if ￿ = 0 the worker
fails. ￿(￿j￿) denotes the probability that a worker of type ￿ sends the signal ￿. The
conditional probability ￿(￿j￿); for ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿ 2 ￿, can be expressed as a simple
function of the parameter s 2 [1=2;1]; which represents the precision of the signal:
￿(1jh) = ￿(0jl) = s (5)
￿(0jh) = ￿(1jl) = 1 ￿ s:
The parameter s is the probability that the test reveals the true type of a worker.
When s = 1=2, the signal is completely uninformative, while if s = 1 the signal
reveals perfectly the type of worker. More in general, the higher the value of s, the
more informative is the signal. In this framework the exogenous parameter s captures
the way institutions a⁄ect the predictability of worker types; IPS are associated with
relatively low values of s: More in particular, the benchmark case of s = 1=2 can be
considered as a quite close characterization of the Italian labor market for manual
workers in the 1980s, when the system of numerical placement lists prevented de jure
any screening activity. In this framework, whether the test is useful as a screening
device ultimately depends only on labor market institutions.
The timing of the action is the following: wages are bargained at the beginning of
the period when a worker and a ￿rm are matched. At the end of the period, production
takes place and wages are paid. If the ￿rm makes negative pro￿ts the worker is ￿red
and the match is destroyed, while if pro￿ts are positive the ￿rm decides to keep the
worker.
The bargaining game is the following: Nature moves ￿rst, and decides whether the
worker with probability ￿ or the ￿rm with probability 1￿￿, makes a take-it or leave-it
o⁄er. An interesting feature of the model resulting from this bargaining protocol is
that workers with the same productivity may receive di⁄erent wages at equilibrium,
since they might be given di⁄erent bargaining powers upon matching. The subgame in
which the ￿rm makes the o⁄er is denoted by ￿f, and the subgame in which the worker
makes the o⁄er is denoted by ￿w. The next subsections characterize the equilibria of
the two subgames restricting attention to equilibria in pure strategies. The extensive
form representation of the subgames and all the proofs of the propositions that follow
are presented in the Appendix.
3.3.1 The worker makes the take-it or leave-it o⁄er
The structure of this subgame is as follows. First, the type of worker matched is
selected with endogenous probabilities p(￿) = u￿=u; for ￿ = l;h. Second, Nature
decides whether the signal sent by the worker is 0 or 1, with probabilities given by
(5). Third, the worker makes the o⁄er, and fourth, the ￿rm accepts or rejects. Finally,
when production takes place, the ￿rm decides whether to fire or keep the worker.
Strategies:
I denote by !w 2 R+ a wage o⁄er made by the worker and chosen from the set R+.
A pure strategy for the worker is a map !w
￿ : ￿ ! R+ from her type space ￿ to her
wage o⁄er space R+. An equilibrium wage o⁄er for the worker is denoted by ^ !w
￿:
7A pure strategy for the ￿rm is a pair of decision rules mapping from its information
set to the available actions a 2 A and b 2 B chosen from the set A = faccept; rejectg
and B = ffire;keepg at the relevant information sets. The decision rule ￿ a : R+ ! A
is a mapping from the worker￿ s wage o⁄er space R+ to the ￿rm￿ s action space A. The
decision rule ￿ b : fR+;￿g ! B is a mapping from the worker￿ s wage o⁄er space R+ and
type space ￿ to the ￿rm￿ s action space B.
Payo⁄s:
If the ￿rm rejects the o⁄er, the worker gets U and the ￿rm gets zero. If the o⁄er
of a worker of type ￿ is accepted and the worker is not ￿red at the end of the period,
the worker gets E￿(!w) and the ￿rm gets J￿(!w). If the worker is ￿red, the ￿rm gets
(y￿ ￿ !w)=(1 + r) and the worker gets (!w + U￿)=(1 + r):
ASSUMPTION 1: the ￿rm decides to accept the wage o⁄er and to keep the worker
if indi⁄erent.
ASSUMPTION 2:
El(yl) ￿ (yh + Ul)=(1 + r):
If Assumption 2 holds, a low type worker prefers to earn yl until job destruction occurs
exogenously rather than earn yh for one period only and be successively ￿red. In section
4, I assign reasonable parameter values to the model and check that this assumption
is always satis￿ed. As I prove formally in the next Proposition, the assumption that
the ￿rm can ￿re workers if pro￿ts are negative acts as a credible threat and induces
workers to separate their wage o⁄ers at equilibrium. As a consequence, the equilibrium
strategy for the wage o⁄ers of high and low type workers is separating, independently
of the precision of the signal s:7
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. Then the wage o⁄ers
^ !w
￿ = y￿ for ￿ = l;h, together with the decisions of the ￿rm to accept both o⁄ers and
to keep the worker once productivity is revealed is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
subgame ￿w:
3.3.2 The ￿rm makes the take-it or leave-it o⁄er
This subgame has the following structure. First, the probabilities p(￿) decide the type
of worker that is hired. Second, Nature chooses the signal, with probabilities given by
(5). Third, the ￿rm makes the o⁄er, and fourth, the worker accepts or rejects. Finally,
at the end of the period, the ￿rm decides whether to fire or keep the worker.
Strategies:
I denote by !f 2 R+ a wage o⁄er made by the ￿rm and chosen from the set R+.
A pure strategy for the ￿rm is a map !f(￿) : ￿ ! R+ from the signal space ￿ to the
￿rm￿ s wage o⁄er space R+ together with a decision rule ￿ b : fR+;￿g ! B mapping
7The condition written in Assumption 2 would not hold if ￿rms were unable to ￿re workers, or if
productivity could only be discovered after a long period of time. Relaxing this assumption would
only increase the complexity of the model without changing the qualitative results.
8from the ￿rm￿ s wage o⁄er space R+ and the worker￿ s type space ￿ to the ￿rm￿ s action
space B = ffire;keepg. An equilibrium wage o⁄er for the ￿rm is denoted by ^ !f(￿):
A pure strategy for the worker is a decision rule ￿ a : fR+;￿g ! A mapping from
the ￿rm￿ s wage o⁄er space R+ and the worker￿ s type space ￿ to the worker￿ s action
space A = faccept;rejectg.
Payo⁄s:
Payo⁄s follow the same structure as in the subgame ￿w.
Beliefs:
The ￿rm uses Bayes￿rule to update its prior beliefs, which are given by the matching













Assumption 4 imposes a restriction on the choice of the parameters yh and yl: Since
rUh strictly increases with yh at equilibrium, Assumption 4 imposes an upper bound
on the di⁄erence between yh and yl: This assumption ensures that the surplus created
by a match be positive when the wage ^ !f(￿) = rUh is o⁄ered to a low type worker. If
Assumption 4 holds, the ￿rm￿ s option to ￿re workers is never exercised at equilibrium,
and therefore a match can only break down for exogenous reasons.
Assumption 5 does not impose any parametric restriction. When the model is
solved numerically, I check that this assumption is satis￿ed for all the parameter values
that support an equilibrium solution.
The economic intuition for the bargaining problem of the ￿rm is the following.
When information is perfect, i.e., s = 1, the outcome of the test perfectly reveals the
type of a worker. If this is the case, when the ￿rm makes the o⁄er, a worker of type ￿
gets rU￿, which is the lowest wage she is willing to accept. When instead information
is incomplete, the outcome of the screening test is no longer perfectly correlated with
with the type of the worker. Under this scenario the ￿rm has to compare expected
costs and bene￿ts associated with each o⁄er. If the low wage rUl is o⁄ered, the ￿rm
enjoys high future pro￿ts Jl(rUl) if the type of worker receiving the o⁄er is low, but it
forgoes any pro￿t if the type of the worker turns out to be high. This follows since it
is optimal for a high type worker to reject any o⁄er lower than rUh: If instead the high
wage rUh is o⁄ered, the ￿rm enjoys lower future pro￿ts Jl(rUh) if the worker is low,
but it still makes positive pro￿ts Jh(rUh) if the worker is high. To put it di⁄erently,
the ￿rm trades-o⁄ insurance against the breakdown of wage negotiations with high
type workers versus higher future pro￿ts with low type workers. Conditional on the
9observation of the signal, it will be therefore optimal for the ￿rm to o⁄er rUh whenever
the following condition holds:
￿(hj￿)Jh(rUh) ￿ ￿(lj￿)[Jl(rUl) ￿ Jl(rUh)]; (7)
where the l.h.s. represents the expected gains from insurance and the r.h.s. represents
the opportunity cost of o⁄ering rUh: Whether condition (7) holds or not depends, in
general, on the distribution of worker types in the unemployment pool, on the outcome
of the test, and on the precision of the signal.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1, Assumption 3, Assumption 4 and Assumption
5 hold. Then the wage o⁄er ^ !f(￿) = rUh, together with the conditional posterior beliefs
system in (6), the decision to accept for both low and high type workers, and the ￿rm￿ s
decision to keep the worker, is the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the subgame
￿f for any ￿ 2 ￿ such that condition (7) holds:
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 3, Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 hold. Then
the wage o⁄er ^ !f(￿) = rUl, together with the conditional posterior beliefs system in
(6), the low type worker￿ s decision to accept, the high type worker￿ s decision to reject,
and the ￿rm￿ s decision to keep the worker, is the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of
the subgame ￿f for any ￿ 2 ￿ such that condition (7) fails to hold.
3.3.3 The solutions of the bargaining game as a function of s
This section investigates how the equilibria of the whole game change with the quality
of information embodied in the signal. Since the equilibrium of the subgame ￿w is
independent of s, a change in the equilibrium of the whole bargaining protocol can
only follow from a change in the equilibrium of the subgame ￿f. I contrast the case in
which the signal is uninformative with the case in which the signal is perfectly infor-
mative and I show that the bargaining game exhibits di⁄erent equilibria. These two
equilibria are characterized with the payo⁄s expected by the players upon engaging in
the bargaining game and with the ￿ ows in and out of the unemployment pool. Section
4 then shows numerically that for all the reasonable parameter values supporting an
equilibrium solution there exists a unique threshold value of s, denoted by s￿, such
that the bargaining game exhibits two di⁄erent sets of equilibrium strategies, one for
s 2 [1=2;s￿], and another for s 2 (s￿;1]:
CASE 1 The signal is uninformative: s = 1=2:
By (5) and (6), if s = 1=2; ￿(￿j￿) = p(￿) for ￿ = l;h: When the signal is unin-
formative the ￿rm￿ s beliefs are given by the matching probabilities and are therefore
independent of the realization of ￿: Consequently, also condition (7) must be indepen-
dent of ￿. The next section shows that condition (7) is always satis￿ed for s = 1=2
when reasonable parameter values are assigned to the model. The equilibrium wage
o⁄er of the ￿rm is therefore pooling when s = 1=2, with the ￿rm o⁄ering ^ !f(￿) = rUh
for both ￿ = 0;1:
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (7) holds for both ￿ = 0;1. Then a matched worker
is of type ￿ with probability:
p(￿) = x￿:
10When the signal is uninformative both types of workers enter and exit from the
unemployment pool at the same rates. This has two implications. The ￿rst is that the
relative measure of type ￿ workers in the unemployment pool is equal to their relative
measure in the labor force, x￿. The second is that the equilibrium unemployment rate
is the same for high and low type workers.
We are now ready to characterize the expected payo⁄s for workers and ￿rms when
^ !f(￿) = rUh is o⁄ered to a worker independently of the outcome of the test, ￿.
Proposition 5 Suppose condition (7) holds for both ￿ = 0;1. Then a worker of type
￿ expects a payo⁄
￿w
￿ = [￿y￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qU￿]=(r + q)
upon engaging in the bargaining game, and the ￿rm expects
￿f = (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ x)yh + xyl ￿ rUh]=(r + q):
In the next section we will see that condition (7) holds in the interval of s 2 [1=2;s￿]
for both ￿ = 0;1. The equilibrium of the labor market is therefore described by
equations (1) to (4) together with the equations in Proposition 5 whenever s 2 [1=2;s￿]:
CASE 2 The signal is perfectly informative: s = 1:
It is easy to show that when s = 1 condition (7) holds for ￿ = 1 but does not hold
for ￿ = 0. Substituting (4) into (7), condition (7) can be rewritten as follows:
￿(hj￿)(yh ￿ rUh) ￿ ￿(lj￿)(rUh ￿ rUl) ￿ 0 for ￿ 2 ￿:
By (6) and (5) ￿(hj1) = ￿(lj0) = 1 and ￿(lj1) = ￿(hj0) = 0 for s = 1. Then (7) is
satis￿ed for ￿ = 1 since yh > yl, and yl ￿ rUh by Assumption 4. On the contrary,
when ￿ = 0 condition (7) fails to hold by Assumption 5. The equilibrium wage o⁄er
of the ￿rm is therefore separating when s = 1, with the ￿rm o⁄ering ^ !f(1) = rUh and
^ !f(0) = rUl:
Proposition 6 Suppose condition (7) holds for ￿ = 1 but does not hold for ￿ = 0.
Then the probability that a low and a high type worker contacts a ￿rm is p(￿) = u￿=u






q + ￿m(￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)s]
:
By Proposition 6 it is possible to note that when s = 1 the unemployment rate
u￿=x￿ is identical for both high and low type workers. For every value of s 2 (s￿;1)
such that condition (7) holds only for ￿ = 1; the unemployment rate will be higher
for high than for low type workers. When the signal is relatively informative high
type workers who send the bad signal reject the wage o⁄er. Therefore, they search
more than low type workers, on average, who accept any wage o⁄er at equilibrium
independently of the outcome of the screening test.
We can now characterize the expected payo⁄s for workers and ￿rms when the wage
o⁄er is conditional to the outcome of the screening test, so that a worker gets rUh
upon passing the test, and rUl otherwise:
11Proposition 7 Suppose condition (7) holds for ￿ = 1 but does not hold for ￿ = 0.
Then a worker of type h expects a payo⁄
￿w
h = [￿yh + (1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qUh]=(r + q)
upon engaging in the bargaining game, a worker of type l expects a payo⁄
￿w
l = [￿yl + s(1 ￿ ￿)rUl + (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qUl]=(r + q)
and the ￿rm expects
￿f = (1 ￿ ￿)[p(h)s(yh ￿ rUh) + p(l)s(yl ￿ rUl) + p(l)(1 ￿ s)(yl ￿ rUh)]=(r + q):
By Proposition 7 it is possible to note that in the special case in which s = 1;
when information is perfect the average wage bargained by a worker of type ￿ = l;h,
￿y￿+(1￿￿)rU￿; is the outcome of the generalized Nash criterion. When the model is
solved numerically in the next Section, we will see that condition (7) holds for ￿ = 1
but does not hold for ￿ = 0 in the interval of s 2 (s￿;1]. The equilibrium of the labor
market is therefore described by equations (1) to (4) together with the equations in
Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 whenever s 2 (s￿;1]:
4 Numerical analysis
In this section numerical values are assigned to the model in order to analyze how the
equilibrium of the labor market is a⁄ected by a change in labor market institutions.
The parameters used for the exercise are reported in the table below.
yh yl x r c ￿ q z￿ ￿
:53 :47 :5 :025 :3 :5 :1 :4y￿ :5
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
One unit of time in the model equals one quarter. Average productivity is normal-
ized to :5; and both types of workers are assumed to be equally distributed, so that
x = :5. The spread between high and low productivity is set arbitrarily, without any ef-
fect on qualitative considerations. In line with the vast majority of studies, the match-
ing process is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function, written M(v;u) = u￿v1￿￿:
The elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment is assumed to
be ￿ = :5; as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). The bargaining power of the workers
is selected to respect the Hosios condition, and so ￿ = :5. Following Shimer (2005), the
income value of an unemployed worker equals 40% of her productivity. Quarterly job
destruction is set to q = :10 as in Shimer (2005), and the cost of a vacancy is c = :3.
The quarterly interest rate is set to :025 as in Italy during the late ￿ 80s.
Numerical solutions of the model show that the game exhibits two sets of equilib-
rium strategies satisfying assumptions 1 to 5. The equilibrium of the subgame ￿f is
pooling when the precision of the signal is low and s 2 [1=2;s￿], with the ￿rm o⁄ering
^ !f (￿) = rUh for both ￿ = 0;1; the equilibrium is separating when the precision of the
12signal is high and s 2 (s￿;1], with the ￿rm o⁄ering rUh when ￿ = 1, and rUl when
￿ = 0. The intuition for the result is the following: so long as the screening device is
not su¢ ciently reliable, i.e., s is below the threshold, it is not pro￿table for the ￿rm to
condition the wage o⁄er to the outcome of the test. If a ￿rm o⁄ers a high type worker
a wage equal to the outside option of a low type worker, the match breaks down, and
its surplus is wasted. Therefore, the ￿rm will not o⁄er rUl unless it perceives that the
probability of facing a low type worker is su¢ ciently high. This can only happen if
the worker fails the test, and if the test is su¢ ciently informative about the type of
the worker, that is, if s is high enough. The equilibrium of the subgame ￿w is instead
independent of s, so that a worker of type ￿ is paid y￿ whenever she makes the o⁄er.
The equilibrium of the labor market in terms of wages, unemployment rates and
wage dispersion is reported in Figure 1 in the Appendix for the parameter values in
Table 1 and for s 2 [1=2;1]. For every value of s; I computed the standard deviation of
wages as an index of wage dispersion. Given the benchmark parametrization, all the
parameter values were changed one at a time as a robustness check for the qualitative
results. The results proved robust to all the changes which support an equilibrium
solution and I summarize them below.
1. When the precision of the signal is relatively low so that information is noisy,
wages are more compressed and unemployment rates are high; when the precision
of the signal is relatively high, information is accurate, wages are more dispersed,
and unemployment rates are low. A trade-o⁄ emerges between unemployment
and wage inequality, which is produced only by the quality of information.
2. When the quality of information embedded in the signal is very low, small vari-
ations in s have no impact on the labor market equilibrium. Given the baseline
parametrization, ￿rms condition their wage o⁄er to the outcome of the test pro-
vided that the signal reveals the true type of the worker with a probability higher
than 74%. At any lower degree of precision, the signal is considered as uninfor-
mative.
3. The average wage drops at the threshold s￿ and strictly decreases with the preci-
sion of the signal in the interval of s 2 (s￿;1]: For values of s below the threshold,
both types of workers receive rUh when the ￿rm makes the o⁄er. To the right
of the threshold, low type workers receive a wage o⁄er equal to rUh only if they
pass the test, and get rUl otherwise. Since Ul < Uh, the shift in the equilib-
rium strategies played by the ￿rm explains why the average wage drops at the
threshold. This e⁄ect largely dominates the following counteracting e⁄ect: while
all wage negotiations succeed for s 2 [1=2;s￿], to the right of s￿ instead, nego-
tiations fail whenever the ￿rm o⁄ers rUl to a high type worker who failed the
test. Therefore, at the threshold the fraction of high type employed workers
who receive yh is higher than to the left of s￿: This e⁄ect tends to increase the
average wage, although its quantitative importance is relatively minor. To the
right of the threshold, both the fraction of low type workers receiving rUl; and
the fraction of high type workers receiving rUh increase with the precision of the
signal. Both e⁄ects therefore contribute to lower the average wage to the right
of the threshold.
134. The value of search for a low type worker drops at s￿ and its behavior is ambigu-
ous to the right of s￿: As the equilibrium strategies played by the ￿rm change
at the threshold, low type workers expect to receive lower wages upon contact,
and their value of search drops. Further increases in the precision of the sig-
nal decrease the expected wage even more, but increase the tightness of the
labor market and the exit rate from unemployment so that the two e⁄ects o⁄set
each other. When the equilibrium strategies played by the ￿rm change at the
threshold, high type workers expect a higher rate of break-down in the wage
negotiations but the same value of the match, since they are indi⁄erent between
working at the wage rUh or searching in the labor market. The value of search
for a high type worker strictly increases to the right of s￿ since the exit rate from
unemployment strictly increases with s:
5. At the threshold s￿ it is possible to observe a strong discrete change both in wage
dispersion and in the average wage, but not in the unemployment rate. While
wage dispersion jumps and the average wage drops at the threshold as a direct
consequence of the change in the equilibrium strategies played by the ￿rm, the
behavior of the unemployment rate at s￿ is ambiguous since it is driven by two
o⁄setting forces. The decrease in the average wage tends to increase the value of
opening a vacancy, but the increase in the failing rate of the wage negotiations
tends to decrease it. Further increases in s; instead, decrease both the average
wage and the rate of break-down of the wage negotiations with high type workers.
Therefore, the unemployment rate decreases without ambiguity at the right of
s￿, although the average productivity of the workers in the unemployment pool
decreases with s, since high type workers exit unemployment at a higher rate. To
the right of the threshold the behavior of wage dispersion is in general ambiguous,
and depends on the parametric speci￿cation of the model. As the precision of the
signal increases, the increase in spread between the wage o⁄ers rUh and rUl tends
to increase wage dispersion. On the other hand, as the rate of break-down in the
wage negotiations with high type workers decreases with s, a lower fraction of
high type workers is employed at the wage yh, and a higher fraction is employed
at the wage rUh: This e⁄ect tends to decrease wage dispersion. As a result, the
index of wage dispersion is roughly constant to the right of s￿:
6. When the precision of the signal is relatively high, s 2 (s￿;1), the unemployment
rate is higher for high type than for low type unemployed workers. Intuitively,
when the test is relatively informative on the nature of worker types, high type
workers who fail the screening test prefer to reject the low wage o⁄er and look for
a new wage o⁄er. For both types of workers the unemployment rates are strictly
decreasing with the precision of the signal since an increase in the e¢ ciency of the
bargaining process increases the pro￿ts expected upon entry and the matching
probability. The unemployment rate is decreasing faster for high type workers
since an increase in s decreases their failing rate in the screening test and increases
their rate of exit from the unemployment pool. In the particular case in which s =
1, information is perfect, and both types of workers ￿ ow out of the unemployment
pool at the same rate.
14The next section presents some empirical evidence which is consistent with the
predictions of the model.
5 Empirical Evidence
The main result of the model is that when individual heterogeneity is no longer pre-
dictable at the time of bargaining, the unemployment rate is higher and wage com-
pression arises endogenously within groups of observationally equivalent workers. Since
IPS clearly characterized the Italian labor market with respect to the US labor mar-
ket, the model can then o⁄er an alternative explanation about why within-group wage
inequality was much lower in Italy than in the US, as measured by Flinn (2002), using
sample data of 1989.
Simulations of the model for the values of s 2 [1=2;1] show that increasing the
precision of the signal, from the lowerbound to the upperbound of the support, leads
to a jump in wage dispersion. Given that this jump re￿ ects the increased ability for
the ￿rms to extract information on the unobservable characteristics of the workers,
what should be observed in the data is a jump in residual wage inequality following a
major increase in the precision of signal extraction, provided that the initial condition
for s is ￿low enough￿ . A natural candidate for this type of reform is the abolition of
the system of numerical placement lists, as seen in 1991.
The micro-data from the Historical Archive of the Bank of Italy￿ s Survey of House-
hold Income and Wealth (SHIW) that allows for the computation of hourly wages
is available only after 1987. Survey data are collected every two years from 1987 to
1995. Since the next survey available after 1995 is 1998, which is after the new wave
of reforms that took place in 1997, I restrict attention to the symmetric time interval
of four years before and after the reform of 1991, the period 1987-1995.
I consider only full-year manual workers. Hourly wages are computed using in-
formation on gross yearly income and average weekly hours worked, and assuming 48
working weeks per year. Real hourly wages are then obtained by de￿ ating the nominal
hourly wages with the base 1991 CPI. I further restrict the sample to the category
of workers who are less than 30 years of age, for whom the likelihood of observing
new entry-level bargained wages is higher. The sample consists of approximately 4000
observations. Real hourly wages are then regressed on a set of observable characteris-
tics such as age, education, gender and regional area, using dummy variables also for
part-time jobs and survey years. The standard deviation of the residuals, reported in
Figure 2 in the Appendix by year, shows a jump of about 30% following the removal
of the numerical placement system in 1991. These ￿ndings seem consistent with the
predictions of the model.
However, other explanations could potentially be compatible with this behavior of
residual wage inequality, such as the abolition in the early 1990s of the scala mobile, a
wage indexation mechanism granting the same absolute wage increase to all employees
as prices rose. It is generally believed that starting from the 1970s, the scala mobile
played an important role in shaping the behavior of wage inequality in Italy. Yet,
the scala mobile hypothesis seems hard to reconcile with the jump in Figure 2 since,
as shown in a study by Manacorda (2004), already by the mid-1980s this indexation
mechanism had ceased to produce any equalizing e⁄ect.
15As described in section 2, the reforms of 1997 and 2003 were important in favoring
further access to screening devices by regulating temporary contracts. The model
predicts that these reforms would be followed by a decrease in the unemployment rate.
The pattern of the data is also consistent with these predictions: the unemployment
rate started to decrease in 1997, from 11.3%, to reach 6.8% in 2006. Furthermore,
the unemployment rate steadily decreased in this period, even during downturns in
economic activity.
6 Conclusions
The microeconomic literature in personnel economics has thoroughly investigated the
importance of screening procedures such as job interviews, probationary periods and
temporary contracts in the ￿rms￿hiring policies. Yet, labor market institutions can
a⁄ect these hiring policies by either preventing ￿rms from testing the workers or by
making the test ine⁄ective as a screening device. In the case of Italy, these institutions
played a central role in the functioning of the labor market. This paper embeds
such institutions into a standard matching model to analyze their macroeconomic
consequences. The main ￿nding is that by preventing ￿rms from screening workers,
these institutions can reduce inequality among observationally equivalent workers, at
the cost of higher unemployment rates. The model therefore o⁄ers an explanation
for the well-documented trade-o⁄ between unemployment and wage inequality. It
also identi￿es, in the institutions a⁄ecting the information content of the screening
procedures, a determinant of within-group wage inequality.
These results were obtained under standard assumptions on the bargaining pro-
tocol. Following the literature on bargaining with asymmetric information, it was
assumed that either the worker or the ￿rm makes a take-it or leave-it o⁄er. Beyond
ensuring tractability, this assumption allows for the recovery of the Nash bargaining
solution for the limit case of perfect information. It is possible, though, that alter-
native bargaining protocols might induce truth-telling equilibrium strategies for the
workers, which can undue the perverse e⁄ects of asymmetric information. Pursuing
mechanism designs in this framework is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for
future research.
This paper takes a ￿rst step towards understanding the macroeconomic impact of
labor market institutions in￿ uencing ￿rms￿screening activity. Such institutions cover
a wide range of rules and regulations governing disparate juridical issues such as pro-
bation periods, the space for possible contractual arrangements or the functioning of
employment placement agencies. All these institutions were condensed through the
modeling strategy into a single parameter representing the precision of the screening
procedures. Although this allows for the development of a simple framework to de-
rive general conclusions, more speci￿c modeling of institutions might help uncover, in
future studies, new mechanisms through which information a⁄ects the labor market
equilibrium.
16A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By backward induction. When making the o⁄er the
worker knows that the best response of the ￿rm is to ￿re her if pro￿ts are negative.
Then, a low type worker would not o⁄er more than yl by Assumption 2. Furthermore,
a high type worker would not o⁄er more than yh since the ￿rm would reject. Since the
￿rm knows that the wage o⁄er yh could only come from a high type, the ￿rm would
accept such an o⁄er by Assumption 1. Therefore, it would not be optimal for a high
type worker to o⁄er any wage lower than yh. Since the wage o⁄er !w
h = yh strictly
dominates all other possible wage o⁄ers for a high type worker, the ￿rm knows that
the o⁄er yl can only come from a low type worker, and would therefore accept it by
Assumption 1. Thus, a low type worker would not o⁄er less than yl; and therefore
the wage o⁄er !w
l = yl strictly dominates all other possible o⁄ers. The wage o⁄ers
^ !w
￿ = y￿ therefore de￿ne the unique Nash equilibrium of this subgame together with
the decision of the ￿rm to accept such o⁄ers, and the decision to keep the worker.
Proof of Proposition 2. By backward induction. When making the o⁄er,
the ￿rm knows that for a worker of type ￿ = l;h the best response is to accept any
wage o⁄er !f : E￿
￿
!f￿
￿ U￿, where the equality sign follows from Assumption 3.
Then, by eq.(1) a worker of type ￿ accepts any o⁄er !f ￿ rU￿ and otherwise rejects.
By Assumption 5, while both types of workers accept the o⁄er !f = rUh, only low
type workers accept the o⁄er !f = rUl. Since the value of a job ￿lled with a worker
of type ￿; J￿ in eq.(4), strictly decreases with the wage, given the best response of
the worker, the ￿rm would never o⁄er any !f(￿) > rUh: By Assumptions 4 the ￿rm
knows that whatever is the type of worker receiving an o⁄er !f(￿) ￿ rUh, pro￿ts will
be non-negative and the ￿rm will keep the worker by Assumption 1. If condition (7)
holds for a given realization of ￿; the pro￿ts expected from the o⁄er rUh; which both
types of workers accept, are higher than the pro￿ts expected from the o⁄er rUl, which
only low type workers accept. Consequently, it must be that the pro￿ts expected from
!f(￿) = rUh are higher than the pro￿ts expected from any !f(￿) < rUh. If this is
the case, ^ !f(￿) = rUh is the unique optimal wage o⁄er for the ￿rm given the best
response of the worker and the system of beliefs in eq.(6), for each value of ￿ that
satis￿es condition (7). This wage o⁄er together with the Bayesian system of beliefs,
the decision of the workers to accept the o⁄er, and the decision of the ￿rm to keep the
worker therefore de￿ne the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this subgame provided
that condition (7) is satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 3. The Proof follows the same steps of the previous one.
By Assumption 3 and eq.(1) the best response for a worker of type ￿ = l;h is to accept
any wage o⁄er !f ￿ rU￿ and otherwise reject. If condition (7) fails to hold, the pro￿ts
expected from the o⁄er rUh which both types of workers accept, is lower than the
pro￿ts expected from the o⁄er rUl, which only low type workers accept. Since J￿ (!)
is strictly decreasing in the bargained wage it follows that, for a given realization of
￿; the wage o⁄er ^ !f(￿) = rUl is optimal and unique given the best response of the
workers and the Bayesian updating of beliefs. By Assumption 4 and Assumption 5
whatever is the type of worker receiving the equilibrium o⁄er rUl, pro￿ts are strictly
positive, and it is optimal for the ￿rm to keep the worker.
Proof of Proposition 4. If condition (7) holds for both ￿ = 0;1, by Proposition
171 and Proposition 2 all agents accept the wage o⁄er at equilibrium. Both types of
workers therefore exit unemployment at rate ￿m(￿). At the stationary state, when
job creation equals job destruction, q (x￿ ￿ u￿) = ￿m(￿)u￿: From the former, u￿ =
qx￿=[q + ￿m(￿)]: Since the probability that a matched worker is of type ￿ equals
p(￿) = u￿=u, substituting the expression for u￿ yields p(￿) = x￿.
Proof of Proposition 5. By Proposition 2 the equilibrium wage o⁄er of the
subgame ￿f is ^ !f(￿) = rUh for both ￿ = 0;1. By Proposition 1 the equilibrium wage
o⁄er of the subgame ￿w is ^ !w
￿ = y￿ for both ￿ = l;h. Then, using eq.(1) the expected
payo⁄ of the whole game for a worker of type ￿ = l;h is:
￿w
￿ = ￿E￿ (y￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ (rUh) =
[￿y￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qU￿]=(r + q):
By Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, and making use of eq.(4), the
expected payo⁄ of the whole game for the ￿rm is:
￿f = (1 ￿ ￿)[p(h)Jh (rUh) + p(l)Jl (rUh)] =
(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ x)yh + xyl ￿ rUh]=(r + q):
Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition
3, a low type worker is matched any time she contacts a ￿rm. Low type workers
therefore exit from the unemployment pool at rate ￿m(￿): The equilibrium of ￿ ows
implies that q (xl ￿ ul) = ￿m(￿)ul; which can be rearranged as ul = qxl=[q + ￿m(￿)]:
By Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, the contact between a high type
worker and a ￿rm results in a match any time the worker makes the o⁄er and when the
￿rm makes the o⁄er and the worker sends the signal ￿ = 1, with probability s. A high
type worker therefore exits unemployment at rate ￿m(￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)s]. When job
creation equals job destruction it must be that q (xh ￿ uh) = ￿m(￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)s]uh;
which can be rewritten: uh = qxh=fq + ￿m(￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)s]g:
Proof of Proposition 7. By Propositions 2 and Proposition 3, it must be that
^ !f(1) = rUh, and ^ !f(0) = rUl. By Proposition 1, ^ !w
￿ = y￿: Using (1) it is possible to
write the payo⁄ expected by a high and a low type worker upon contact as:
￿w
h = ￿Eh (yh) + (1 ￿ ￿)[sEh (rUh) + (1 ￿ s)Uh] =
[￿yh + (1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qUh]=(r + q);
￿w
l = ￿El (yl) + (1 ￿ ￿)[sEl (rUl) + (1 ￿ s)El (rUh)] =
[￿yl + s(1 ￿ ￿)rUl + (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qUl]=(r + q):
Using (4), the payo⁄ expected by the ￿rm is:
￿f = (1 ￿ ￿)[p(h)sJh (rUh) + p(l)sJl (rUl) + p(l)(1 ￿ s)Jl (rUh)] =
(1 ￿ ￿)[p(h)s(yh ￿ rUh) + p(l)s(yl ￿ rUl) + p(l)(1 ￿ s)(yl ￿ rUh)]=(r + q):
181920Figure 1: Simulation results for the parameter values in Table 1.
21Figure 2: Residual wage dispersion for full-year manual workers younger than 30
years of age in Italy. Author￿ s calculations from the SHIW panel of the Bank of Italy.
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